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This paper studies to which extent a firm using a scarce resource input and facing environmental 
regulation, can still manage to have a sustainable growth of output and profits. The firm has a 
vintage capital technology with two complementary factors, capital and a resource input subject to 
quota, the latter being increasingly scarce through an exogenously rising price. The firm can scrap 
obsolete capital and invest in adoptive and/or innovative R&D resource-saving activities. We show 
that there exists a threshold level for the growth rate of the resource price above which the firm will 
collapse. Below this threshold, two important properties are found. In the long-run, a sustainable 
growth is possible at a growth rate which is independent of the resource price. In the short-run, not 
only will the firms respond to increasing resource price by increasing R&D on average, but they 
will also reduce capital expenditures and speed up the scrapping of older capital goods. Finally, we 
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A crucial issue repeatedly addressed in the ongoing debate on sustainable development is 
the possibility for the economies to keep on growing while confronted to physical limits 
and  legal  constraints  such  like  those  related  to  the  limited  availability  or  regenerative 
capacity of natural resources (fossil energy, fish, forest, etc.), to economic and ecological 
regulation (emission quotas, harvesting quotas, etc.), or to financial resource constraints at 
the firm or national economy level.  One of the common ideas turns out to be that such a 
growth  possibility  is  certainly  widely  open  if  the  economies  are  able  to  maintain  a 
permanent stream of innovations, assuring long-term technological progress (see Arrow et 
al., 2004, for a comprehensive view of sustainability).  
In  terms  of  economic  theory,  the  issue  actually  traces  back  to  seminal  studies  on  the 
relationship between resource scarcity and innovation. Scarcer resources are increasingly 
expensive, and this should in a way affect the behavior of consumers and firms and end up 
shaping  the  direction  of  technological  progress.  A  related  fundamental  hypothesis, 
popularized by Hicks (1932), is the so-called induced-innovation hypothesis: a change of 
relative prices of production inputs stimulates innovation directed to save the production 
factor that becomes relatively expensive. In the context of the energy consumption debate, 
this hypothesis simply stipulates that in periods of rapidly rising energy prices (relative to 
other  inputs),  economic  agents  will  find  it  more  profitable  to  develop  alternative 
technologies, that is, energy-saving technologies. In their well-known work on the menu of 
home appliances available for sale in the US (between 1958 and 1993), Newell, Jaffee, and 
Stavins (1999) concluded that a large portion of energy efficiency improvements in US 
manufacturing  seems  to  be  autonomous,  and  therefore  not  driven  by  the  Hicksian 
mechanism outlined above. However, they also concluded that a non-negligible part of the 
observed improvement can be attributed to price changes and to the emergence of new 
energy-efficiency standards, ultimately leading to the elimination of old models. 
Indeed, just like scarcity, regulation can also be a decisive determinant of technological 
progress. As an immediate illustration of such a potential nexus, environmental economists 
use  to  put forward  the so-called  Porter  hypothesis (Porter, 1991) according to which a   2
carefully  designed  environmental  regulation  can  increase  firm  competitiveness  by 
encouraging innovation in environmental technologies. A considerable amount of studies 
has been devoted to the empirical corroboration of this hypothesis, reaching distinct and 
contrasted conclusions (see Parto and Herbert-Copley, 2007, for an excellent compilation 
of case studies). 
In  this  paper,  we  study  optimal  firm  response  to  the  simultaneous  occurrence  of 
environmental regulation constraints and to scarcity (of production inputs).  This is 
definitely  much  more  than  an  academic  exercise:  typically,  firms  have  to  deal  with 
environmental regulation (like emission quotas and other environmental norms) and with 
the rising prices of some goods, usually natural resources prices. More importantly, the 
decisions of the firms, notably on the R&D investment side, do depend on both types of 
constraints in a far nontrivial way. A real-life example of such a situation is documented in 
Yarime (2007) on the Japanese chlor-alkali industry producing chlorine and caustic soda 
through electrolysis, therefore involving a large energy consumption.
5 Initially, the industry 
uses  a  mercury-based  electrolysis  technique  which  resulted  in  a  major  human  and 
ecological damage.
6 Environmental regulation pushed this industry to start the adoption of 
an alternative electrolysis technique, the US diaphragm technology. But this adoption was 
drastically  slowed  down  during  the  first  oil  shock  because  it  turned  out  that  the  US 
technology was much more expensive in terms of energy consumption than the traditional 
mercury-based technique. R&D programs have been therefore re-directed in the sake of 
alternative devises, less polluting than the latter and much less energy consuming than the 
former. 
 
In this paper, we consider the worst scenario for a firm: (1) no market power (the firm is 
price-taker), (2) liquidity-constraints (the firm cannot incur in a negative cash flow at any 
date), (3) a quota constraint on the use of a resource input (fossil energy or natural resource 
like fish as immediate examples), which may feature emission or extraction quotas, (4) the 
price of this production input is increasing reflecting scarcity, and (5) no substitution is 
                                                 
5 Yarime (2007) reports that about 3% of total industry electricity consumption in Japan can be attributed to 
the chlor-alkali industry in 1996, which also accounts for about one-fifth of total chemical industry in this 
year.  
6  It  was  relatively  quickly  established  that  the  mercury  released  by  the  chlor-alkali  industry  to  the 
neighboring seas was the cause of the so-called Minimata disease, which caused about 700 victims in that 
time.   3
possible between this resource and other production inputs. In such a context, could the 
firm experience a sustainable growth of profits?  
Answering  this  question  properly  requires  accounting  for  a  comprehensive  set  of 
modernization instruments that the firm can use in response to the above constraints. At 
first place, the role of innovation and technology adoption at the firm and/or industry level 
is key. If the firms respond to the latter constraints and circumstances by doing more R&D 
and/or  adopting  better  technologies,  then  the  “sustainability  problem”,  stated  in  the 
beginning, can be at least partially solved. But firms cannot always push on this command 
button for many reasons. First of all,  firms are subject to financial or liquidity constraints, 
as mentioned above. If the firms do not face any type of financial constraints, then they 
could  finance  R&D  expenditures  and/or  technology  adoption  with  no  limit,  which  is 
certainly unrealistic. Second,  technological complexity can be a decisive factor. It is very 
well known that the success of R&D and technology transfer programs depends, among 
others, on the complexity and sophistication of the technologies to be up-graded (see for 
example, Segerstrom, 2000). We shall account for it in our modeling. 
In  addition  to  innovative  and/or  adoptive  R&D,  firms  may  decide  to  scrap  old  and 
definitely non-sustainable technologies with their associated capital goods and to replace 
them (or not) with leading technologies and new equipment. If one aims to capture the 
mechanisms  of  modernization,  the  latter  instruments  are  crucial.  Typically,  firms  will 
respond by combining all these instruments and by choosing the optimal timing for each of 
them.  We  take  this  avenue  here  by  considering  vintage  technologies  at  the  firm  level, 
allowing the firm to innovate, to scrap, and to invest.  
We shall use vintage capital technologies in line with Malcomson (1975), Benhabib and 
Rustichini (1991), Boucekkine et al. (1997, 1999) and Hritonenko and Yatsenko (1996, 
2005). There are two inputs, capital and a resource subject to quota, which can be fossil 
energy or any natural resource. Capital goods produced at different dates embody different 
technologies, the youngest vintages are the most resource-saving. Beside realism, working 
with vintage capital production functions allows us to capture some key elements of the 
problem  under  consideration,  which  would  be  lost  under  the  typical  assumption  of 
homogenous capital. For instance, facing an emission tax, firms are tempted to downsize. 
However, in the vintage capital framework where the firm also chooses the optimal age   4
structure  of  capital,  downsizing  entails  modernization:  the  oldest  and,  thus,  the  least 
efficient technologies are then removed.  
 
Main contributions 
Our paper essentially makes three contributions: 
i)  Within a realistic (and thus sophisticated) firm framework, it characterizes finely 
the inducement mechanisms at work. Essentially, our work identifies a highly nonlinear 
inducement mechanism. In particular, there exists a threshold level for the growth rate of 
the  resource  price  above  which  the  firm  will  collapse:  for  these  price  values,  the 
inducement mechanism does not even make sense. Below this threshold, two important 
properties  are  found  out.  In  the  long-run,  sustainable  growth  regimes  are  possible  but 
within  such  regimes,  the  growth  rate  of  technological  progress  is  independent  of  the 
resource price. In our work, this is a long-term property, which occurs when the resource 
price does not grow too much. In the short-run, the inducement mechanism seems to work: 
not only will the firms respond to increasing resource price by increasing resource-saving 
investment  on  average,  they  will  also  reduce  capital  expenditures  and  speed  up  the 
scrapping of older (and more resource consuming) capital goods, which is highly consistent 
with the evidence gathered by Newell et al. (1999). 
ii)  Secondly, our paper makes a contribution to the literature of growth under scarcity 
and regulation, which is an important component of the modern environmental economics 
literature  (see  for  example,  Tsur  and  Zemel,  2005).  With  respect to  this  literature,  our 
contribution is triple. We model scarcity as an exponential function of any positive growth 
rate  (including  constant  prices).  Therefore,  our  study  integrates  either  Hotelling-like  or 
backstop  technology  pricing  or  combinations  of  both.  Second,  since  both  scarcity  and 
regulation are considered, it is possible to study which one is more harmful (if any) to 
growth.  For  constant  resource  prices  (no  scarcity),  we  show  that  sustainable  growth 
regimes are always possible thanks to endogenous technical progress under non-increasing 
input quotas and despite liquidity constraints. Under scarcity, this property holds as long as 
the  growth  rate  of  the  resource  price  is  below  a  threshold.  Above  this  threshold,  no 
sustainable  growth  is  possible.    A  third  contribution  relies  on  the  optimal  transition 
dynamics derived. In particular, we concentrate in two regimes: intensive growth (sustained 
investment in new capital and in R&D with scrapping of the oldest capital goods), and   5
extensive growth (sustained investment in new capital and in R&D without scrapping of 
the oldest capital goods). In particular, our paper is the first one to disentangle the last 
transition regime as a possible optimal regime.  
iii)  Last but not least, the contribution is technical. To our knowledge, this is the first 
paper with vintage capital, endogenous scrapping, and endogenous technological progress 
(see  next  paragraph  for  more  details).  The  technical  difficulties  are  numerous  but  we 
manage to find a way to bring out a fine enough analytical characterization of optimal 
paths. 
Relation to the literature 
Our  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  of vintage capital  models.  Due  to  the  analytical 
complexity of vintage models, very few papers rely on such specifications. A noticeable 
exception  is  Feichtinger,  Hartl,  Kort,  and  Veliov  (2005)  who  introduced  a  proper 
specification of embodied technological progress underlying the considered vintage capital 
structure.  They  concluded  that  if  learning  costs  are  incorporated  into  the  analysis  (i.e., 
running new machines at their full productivity potential takes time), then the magnitude of 
modernization effect is reduced, and regulation has a markedly negative effect on industry 
profits. Our paper extends the latter result in two important directions: it endogenizes the 
optimal lifetime of technologies and associated equipment through endogenous scrapping 
decision  and  it  endogenizes  the  pace  of  technological  progress  in  the  workplace  by 
considering an optimal innovative or adoptive R&D decision (the technological progress is 
exogenous  at  the  firm  level  in  Feichtinger  et  al.  (2005).  In  such  a  context,  the  set  of 
possible modernization strategies is much richer.  On the other hand, our paper extends the 
more traditional vintage literature following Solow et al. (1966), like Boucekkine et al. 
(1997)  or  Hritonenko  and  Yatsenko  (1996),  by  endogenizing  technical  progress,  which 
definitely enriches the model in many directions as it will be explained along the way. 
Recently,  Hart  (2004)  has  built  up  a  multisectoral  endogenous  growth  model  with  an 
explicit vintage sector. Beside the macroeconomic approach taken, this paper differs from 
ours in many essential respects: there are two types of R&D, one output-augmenting and 
the other, say, environmental-friendly, while in our model only resource-saving adoptive 
and/or innovative R&D is allowed. In addition, the model of Hart (2004) has no explicit 
scarcity feature, and the treatment of vintages is rather short (only two exogenously given 
vintages are considered in the end, no endogenous scrapping incorporated).    6
On the other hand, our paper is directly related to the literature on technological progress 
under  increasing  energy  prices  and  regulation,  as  surveyed  by  Jaffe  et  al.  (2002).  As 
explained above,  it  can  be  connected  to  the  empirical  findings  in  the field. Beside the 
already mentioned paper of Newell et al. (1999), it can be indeed closely related to the 
recent important work of Popp (2002). Using energy patent citations, the latter establishes 
that both energy prices and the quality of the existing knowledge have significantly shaped 
energy-saving  innovations,  therefore  confirming  the  relevance  of  the  inducement 
mechanism in this context. Moreover, Popp also shows clearly that the omission of the 
existing quality of knowledge negatively affects the estimation results. In our modeling, we 
do account for the latter feature through the complexity effect à la Segerstrom outlined 
above.  Last  but  not  least,  our  paper  can  be  also  directly  connected  to  the  theoretical 
literature on scarcity and growth originating in the limits to growth stream. In particular, it 
shares  with  Tsur  and  Zemel  (2005)  the  objective  to  characterize  the  different  possible 
optimal patterns of technological progress and growth when the resources are increasingly 
scarce.  Our  vintage  approach  and  the  inclusion  of  environmental  regulation  allows  for 
some more insight into the impact of scarcity on sustainable development.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  formally  describes  our  firm 
optimization problem and outlines some of its peculiarities. Section 3 derives the optimality 
conditions and interprets them. Section 4 is concerned with the long-term optimal behavior 
of  firms  and  Section  5  identifies  the  short-term  modernization strategies  that  the  firms 
pursue in response to regulation and prices. Section 6 concludes.  
2. The firm problem 
We shall consider the problem of a firm seeking to maximize the net profit that takes into 
account the consumption E(t) of a regulated resource, the investment R(t) to innovative 
and/or adoptive R&D, and the investment m(t) into new capital:  
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                 c(t) =  ) 1 ( q - Q(t) - p(t)E(t) - R(t) - k(t)m(t)                                              (3) 
is the net profit or cash flow, q  is a tax rate on production or sales (which could be also 
interpreted as an emission tax in the environmental context, see Feichtinger et al., 2005) . 
We  postulate  a  Leontief  vintage  capital  production  function  as  in  Malcomson  (1975), 
Boucekkine,  Germain,  and  Licandro  (1997,  1999)  or  Hritonenko  and  Yatsenko  (1996, 
2005). In equation (2), a(t) measures the vintage index of the oldest machine still in use at 
time  t, or  in  other  words,  t-a(t)  is the scrapping time at date t. The complexity of the 
optimization  problem  considered  in  this  paper  comes  from  the  fact  that  a  is  a  control 
variable, which is quite unusual in economic theory. We shall come back to this point in 
detail later. For now, let us notice that we do not assume any output-augmenting (embodied 
or disembodied) technological progress: whatever the vintage t  is, all machines produce 
one unit of output. In our framework, the technological progress is exclusively resource-
saving,  which  is  the  key  component  of  the  debate  around  technological  progress  and 
environmental sustainability.  
In contrast to the related literature (notably to Feichtinger et al., 2005, 2006), we assume 
that firms choose the optimal lifetime of their capital goods, and also invest in adoptive 
and/or  innovative  R&D.  Let  us  call  b(t)  the  level  of  the resource-saving  technological 
progress at date t. We postulate that this level evolves endogenously according to:  











                                                            (4) 
where  f  is  increasing  and  concave:  df/dR>0,  d
2f/dR
2<0.  Equation  (4)  deserves  a  few 
comments. It stipulates that the rate of resource-saving technical progress is an increasing 
(and concave) function of the R&D effort and a decreasing function of its level. The latter 
specification  is  designed  to  reflect  the  negative  impact  of  technological  complexity  on 
R&D success. The parameter d measures the extent to which complexity impacts the rate of 
technological progress (see Segerstrom, 2000, for example). It will play an important role 
hereafter, consistently with the available evidence on the role of technological complexity 
in the adoption of new technologies.   8
We also assume that the resource-saving technological progress is fully embodied in new 
capital  goods,  which  implies,  keeping  the  Leontief  structure  outlined  above,  that  total 
resource consumption is given by  
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Now we introduce the quota constraint on the regulated resource:  
                E(t) £ Emax(t),                                                                                          (6)                        
where the regulation function Emax(t) is given. The firms are also subject to a second type 
of  constraint,  financial  constraint,  which  we  also  model  in  a  straightforward  way  by 
imposing the non-negativity of cash-flows, c(t), at any date t, as we will see later. 
 
Let us now summarize the optimal control problem to tackle. The unknown functions are: 
¨  the investment m(t), m(t)³0, into new capital (measured in the capacity units) 
¨  the R&D investment R(t), R(t)³0, and the technology b(t),   
¨  the capital scrapping time t-a(t), a¢ (t) ³ 0,  a(t) < t, 
¨  the output Q(t), cash-flow c(t),  and resource consumption E(t),  tÎ[0,¥). 
The constraints are given by the quota (6), the positivity and liquidity constraints, and other 
regularity conditions: 
        R(t) ³ 0,      c(t) ³ 0,      m (t) ³ 0,            a¢(t) ³ 0,     a(t) ≤  t,                        (7)  
The  constraint  a¢(t)³0  is  standard  in  vintage  capital  models  and  implies  that  scrapped 
machines cannot be reused. We shall also specify the initial conditions as follows: 
                    a(0) = a0<0,   b(a0)=b0,   m(t) º m 0(t),  R(t)ºR0(t),  tÎ[a0,0].                   (8) 
The optimal control problem (1)-(8) has several mathematical peculiarities. We come back 
to the technical part in the next Section 3 where the necessary optimality conditions are 
developed.  Before  this,  let  us  start  stressing  that  in  our  modelling,  technological 
improvements affect only the new capital goods. This is crystal clear in equation (5) giving 
total  resource  consumption.  Of  course, this need not to be the case in general. Part of 
resource-saving innovations is probably disembodied, and a more general formulation of 
the problem taking into account this aspect would, in particular, replace the ODE (4) for 
b(t) by a PDE for b(t,t). This extension is out of the scope of this paper. Second, one would 
find somehow strange to have imposed scarcity (exogenously increasing price) and a quota   9
on the same input. There are two different responses to this objection. The first one is to 
defend the realism of such a specification. Suppose this resource input is fossil energy. 
Then  such  a  resource  is  typically  increasingly  scarce,  but  at  the  same  time,  pollution 
quotas, as originated in international protocols, do imply upper bounds on the use of such 
an input. Second, we will see rather quickly that scarcity and quota do  not have at all the 
same implications within our set-up so that one can directly figure out that there is no 
redundancy between the two characteristics. Last but not least, one has to mention that the 
results obtained in this framework will remain qualitatively the same in an optimal growth 
set-up with a linear utility function. With nonlinear utility functions, the (already extremely 
complicated) problem becomes even more trickier due to the endogeneity of the interest 
rate. We, therefore, choose the firm problem setting, which is rather traditionnal for the 
questions raised in this paper (see Kamien and Schwartz, 1969) .
7 
3. Extremum conditions 
Let  us  derive  optimality  conditions.  For  mathematical  convenience,  we  change  the 
unknown (decision) variable m(t) to 
                                                      m(t) = m(t)/b(t),                                                      (9) 
which is also the investment into new capital (but measured in resource consumption units 
rather than in capacity units). In the variables R and m, the optimization problem (1)-(8) 
becomes  
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         R(t)³0,    m(t)³0,     c(t) ³ 0,      a¢(t) ³ 0,     a(t) ≤  t,                               (14) 
              a(0) = a0<0,   b(a0)=b0,   m(t) º m0(t),  R(t)ºR0(t),  tÎ[a0, 0].                   (15) 
                                                 
7 The computations for the optimal growth model with linear utility are available upon request.    10
The substitution (9) removes b(t) from equation (5) and adds it to the last term in the 
functional (10). Equation (4) for the unknown b(t) remains the same. In the case d>0, the 
solution of (4) has the form: 
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+ ∫ = b b is  uniquely  determined  by  the 
initial conditions (15). From now on, we work with the following explicit specification for 
endogenous technological progress:  
                                     f(R)=bR
n,    0<n<1,    b>0.                                                     (17) 
By (4), this implies that the elasticity of the rate of technological progress with respect to 
R&D expenditures is constant and equal to n. The larger is n, the bigger is the efficiency of 
investing in R&D. 
The optimization problem (OP) (10)-(17) includes seven unknown functions R, b, m, a, Q, 
c, and E connected by four equalities (11), (12), (13), and (16). Following Hritonenko and 
Yatsenko (1996) and Yatsenko (2004), we will choose R, m, and a¢ as the independent 
decision variables (controls) of the OP and consider the rest of the unknown functions b, m, 
a, Q, c, and E as the dependent (state) variables.  
The majority of optimization models of mathematical economics are treated using first-
order conditions for interior trajectories only. In contrast, the nature of the OP (10)-(17) 
requires taking into account the inequalities E(t)£Emax(t), R(t)³0, m(t)³0, a¢(t)³0, a(t)£t, 
and c(t)³0 on unknown variables in the constraints (13) and (14). These inequalities have 
an  essential  impact  on  extremum  conditions  and  optimal  dynamics  and  are  treated 
differently in the below analysis. The inequalities R³0 and m³0 are the standard constraints 
on  control  variables,  which  are  common  in  the  optimization  theory.  The  non-standard 
constraints a¢(t)³0 and a(t)≤t are handled following the technique developed by Hritonenko 
and Yatsenko in several papers already cited. The constraint E£Emax is considered in two 
cases  of  Theorem  1  below.  Finally,  the constraint  c³0  is  the  most inconvenient and is 
analyzed separately in Section 5 (see also Remark 2 below).  
Let the given functions p, k, and Emax be continuously differentiable, and m0 and R0 be 
continuous. To keep the OP statement correct, the smoothness of the unknown variables   11
should be consistent. We will assume that R and m (and a¢ when necessary) are measurable 
almost everywhere (a.e.) on [0,¥). Then, the unknown state variables a, c, Q, and E in (10)-
(15) are a.e. continuous on [0,¥), as established in Hritonenko and Yatsenko (2006). We 
also assume a priori that the improper integral in (10) converges. The necessary condition 
for an extremum (NCE) in the OP (10)-(17) is given by the following statement  
 
Theorem 1. Let R*(t), m*(t), a*(t), b*(t), Q*(t), c*(t), E*(t), tÎ[0,¥), be a solution of the 
OP (10)-(17).  
(A) If E*(t)=Emax(t) and c*(t)>0 at tÎDÌ[0,¥), and Emax¢(t)£0, then  
                     IR'(t)=0  at  R*(t)>0,                                                                  (18) 
                      Im'(t)£0 at  m*(t)=0,         Im'(t)=0  at  m*(t)>0,    tÎD,                       (19) 
where  
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the state variable a(t) is determined from (13), a
-1(t) is the inverse function of a(t), and       
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(B) If E*(t)<Emax(t) and c*(t)>0 at tÎD, then  
                                      IR'(t)=0  at  R*(t)>0,                                          
                  Im'(t)£0 at  m*(t)=0,         Im'(t)=0  at  m*(t)>0,                                          (23) 
                 Ia’'(t)£0  at  da*(t)/dt=0,      Ia’'(t)=0  at  da*(t)/dt>0,    tÎD,                  
where  
      [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 )( ( ) ( '
) (
1
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,                                        (24) 
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t d a m a p e t I
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-
¥
∫ ,                    (25)   12
IR'(t) is as in (20), and b(t) is as in (22).   
The  proof  is  very  long  and  technical  and  we  report  all  its  details  in  Appendix.  The 
expressions (20), (21), (24), and (25) are the Frechet derivatives of the functional I in 
variables R, m, and a’. The derivative Im’(t) has different forms (21) and (24) depending on 
whether the restriction (13) is active or inactive. Before giving the economic interpretation 
of the optimality conditions, some technical comments are in order.  
 
Remark  1.  If  (13)  is  active  (Case  A),  then  the  state  variable  a  is  determined  from 
m(a(t))a¢(t)=m(t)- Emax¢(t) and the state restriction a¢³0 on the variable a in (14) is satisfied if 
Emax¢(t)£0, tÎ[0,¥). If the condition Emax¢(t)£0 fails for some tÎDÌ[0,¥), then Theorem 1 is still 
valid in Case A if we replace the differential constraint a’(t)³0 in (14) with the stricter constraint  
m(t) ³ max{0, Emax¢(t)} on the control m (see Hritonenko and Yatsenko, 2006).                   
Remark 2. To keep mathematical complexity reasonable, we have not included the constraint 
c(t)³0 into the NCE. To be complete, Theorem 1 needs to include two more cases: E*<Emax, c*=0, 
and E*=Emax, c*=0. The problem (10)-(17) in these cases should be treated as an OP with state 
constraints, which leads to certain mathematical challenges (see Hartl, Sethi, and Vickson, 1995, 
for an insight into this issue). As we shall see, the regime c*(t)=0 does not appear in the long-term 
dynamics (Section 4). We return to its analysis in Section 5, where it arises during the transition 
dynamics as one of possible scenarios. Notice also that the corner case R*(t)=0 is impossible with 
our specification of function f(R). 
Remark 3. Sufficient conditions for an extremum for such OPs are complicated and involve the 
second Freshet derivatives of the functional I. The authors derived and analyzed such a condition in 
the form  0
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
<
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
t I t I
t I t I
mm mR
Rm RR at R=R*, m=m* for Case (A). It is not included into this paper.    
 
Let us move now to some economic interpretations of the obtained first-order optimality 
conditions. In order to compare more easily with the existing literature, we start with Case 
(A), that is, when the quota constraint is binding. Indeed, in such a case, the latter can be 
broadly viewed as an “equilibrium” condition in the resource market, where the quota plays 
the role of supply. Let us interpret the optimality conditions with respect to investment and 
R&D, the case of scrapping being trivially fixed by Remark 1 above. Using equations (19) 
and (21), the (interior) optimal investment rule may be rewritten as:   13
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) (
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The interpretation of such a rule is quite natural having in mind the early vintage capital 
literature (notably, Solow et al., 1966, and Malcomson, 1975) as exploited in Boucekkine, 
Germain, and Licandro (1997). In our model, one unit of capital at date t costs k(t) or 
) (t k e
rt -  in present value. This is the right-hand side of the optimal rule above. The left-
hand side should, therefore, give us the marginal benefit from investing. Effectively, it is 
the integral of discounted gains from investing over the lifetime of a machine bought at t 
(since a
-1(t)  is  by  construction  the lifetime of such a machine). At any date comprised 
between t and a
-1(t), a machine bought at t will provide one unit of output but the firm has 











is the resource requirement of any machine bought at date t. Therefore, )) ( ( t b a  plays 
the role of the effective price of the input paid by the firm. How could this be rationalized? 
Simply  by  noticing  that  under  a  binding  quota,  the  latter  mimics  a  clearing  market 
condition as in the early vintage macroeconomic literature (see for example, Solow et al., 
1966).
8 In such a framework, the marginal productivities of energy should be equalized 
across vintages, implying a tight connection between the effective price of resource and the 
resource requirement of the oldest machine still operated. More precisely, the latter price, 
which  happens  to  be  the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  to  the  binding  environmental 
constraint, is equal to the inverse of the resource requirement of the oldest machine still in 
use, which is equal to  )) ( ( t b a  at any date t comprised between t and a
-1(t). Notice that in 
such a case, the effective price of resource )) ( ( t b a  is not generally equal to p(t). The latter 
does  not  play  any  role  since  resource  consumption  becomes  predetermined  equal  to 
p(t)Emax(t) in the constrained regime.  
Things  are  completely  different  in  the  case  where  the  quota  is  not  binding  (case  B  of 
Theorem 1). In such a case, the optimal investment rule becomes (following equation (24)): 
         ) (
























                                                 
8 In Solow et al., the role of resource is played by labor.   14
and  ) 1 ( q - )) ( ( t b a = p(t) as in the firm problem studied by Malcomson (1975), making a 
clear  difference  with  respect  to  the  constraint  case  A.  Our  framework  thus  extends 
significantly the benchmark theory to allow for situations in which resource input markets 
do not necessarily clear due to institutional constraints. 
Let us interpret now the R&D optimal rule, which is also new in the literature. Using  (20), 
it is given by 
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The  right-hand  side  is  simply  the  present  value  of  marginal  investment  in  R&D.  The 
marginal benefit is given by the left-hand side. Contrary to the optimal investment rule, the 
gains  from  doing  R&D  last  forever:  the  R&D  investment  induces  a  knowledge 
accumulation process, which is not subjected to obsolescence in our case, in contrast to 
capital goods. The integrand can be understood if one has in mind the maximized function 
(10) in the form  
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¥
-        
and the given endogenous law (16),(17) of motion of technological progress.  It should be 
noticed that rewriting the problem in terms of m(t), rather than in terms of investment in 
physical units m(t), does not mean rewriting a problem with input-saving technical progress 
as a problem with output-augmenting technical progress. As one can see, at the fixed m(t), 
an increase of R(t) (and, therefore, b(t)) increases not only the output Q(t) but also the 
investment expenditures through the term  ) ( ) ( ) ( t m t t k b . The left-hand side of the optimal 
R&D rule takes precisely into account this trade-off. On one hand, the marginal increase in 








, impacts positively output 
by  improving  the  efficiency  of  all  vintages  after  the  date  t.  Let  us  notice  that,  since 
machines have a finite lifetime, this effect should be computed between t and a
-1(t) for 
each vintage t, which explains the factor 
r
e e
ra r ) (
1 t t








rsds e  in the integrand. On 
the other hand, the rising b(t) increases investment expenditures (for a fixed m(t)), which 
explains the negative term,  ) (t
tk e
r - , in the integrand.   15
 
Let us now move to the study of the system of the optimality conditions extracted above. 
We first start by seeking for exponential solutions (for naturally growing variables like 
R(t)), the so-called balanced growth paths (Section 4),  in order to address in a standard way 
the critical issue of sustainable growth under constraint, which is one of the main questions 
asked  in  this  paper.  We  then  move  to  short-term  dynamics  (Section  5)  to  identify  the 
principal modernization routes. 
4. Analysis of optimal long–term dynamics.    
For the sake of clarity, we restrict ourselves to the case  
               0 const ) (       0, const ) (   max > = = > = = E t E k t k .                                           (26) 
Alternative  trajectories  for  the  exogenous  variables  k(t)  and  Emax(t)  are  studied  in 
Boucekkine, Hritonenko, and Yatsenko (2008). The optimal long–term dynamics of the OP 
can involve interior regimes such that IR'º0 and Im'º0. Let us assume that the quota is 
active in the long run: E(t)=Emax(t) at tÎ[tl, ¥), tl≥0. We will study the alternative case 
later.  The  corresponding  long-term  interior  regime  (RL,  mL,  aL)  is  determined  by  the 
system of three nonlinear integral equations  
                                 IR'(t)=0,         Im'(t)=0,                                                                  (27) 
                          max
) (
) ( E d m
t
t a
= ∫ t t ,     tÎ[tl , ¥),                                                           (28) 
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) ( / ) ( 1 ) 1 (     (30) 
at tÎ[tl, ¥).   
We will explore the possibility of exponential solutions for R(t), while m(t) and t-a(t) are constant, 
to the system (28)-(30) separately in the cases n=d, n>d and n<d. First of all, we start with the 
following preliminary result: if R(t) is exponential, then b(t) is almost exponential and practically 
undistinguishable from an exponent at large t in the sense of the following lemma:   16
Lemma 1. If R(t)=R0e
Ct for some C>0, then
9  
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at large t. In particular, b(t)= ( )
d Cnt d d n e Cn bd R
/ / 1 /
0 /  if  bdR0
n = CnB
d.             
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   (32) 
Expanding the function (1+x)










+ = , where the 














































t e  decreases as 
e
-Cnt. The lemma is proved.                     
 
We now define the concept of balanced growth paths considered. 
Definition 1. The Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is a solution (R, m, a) to (28), (29) and 
(30), where R(t) is exponential and m(t) and t-a(t) are positive constants, which satisfy 
constraints (14), in particular, the non-negative cash-flow requirement.   
If the quota is not binding, then the system to be solved is  
                                IR'(t)=0,       Im'(t)=0,      Ia''(t)=0,   tÎ[tl ,¥),                               (33) 
where IR'(t), Im'(t) and Ia''(t) are determined by (20), (24), and (25). As shown below, the 
optimal long-term growth with inactive regulation, E<Emax, is possible only at n>d (see 
Section 4.2).
10  
                                                 
9 For brevity, we will omit the expression “at large t” when using the notation f(t) » g(t) 
10 In the case of the inactive quota constraint, it is convenient to introduce the Frechet derivative 
          )) ( ( ] )) ( ( [ ) 1 ( ) ( '   t a m t a e P e t I
t rt
a b q
g - - =
-                    (34) 
in a instead of the derivative (25) in a’ and use it during BGP analysis. Indeed, it is easy to see that if  
Ia’'(t)º0 at  tÎ[ tl ,¥) for some tl³0,  then Ia'(t)º0 at  tÎ[ tl ,¥).     17
4.1.  Balanced growth in case n=d. 
Let the parameter n of “R&D efficiency”, 0<n<1, be equal to the parameter d of “R&D 
complexity”,  0<d<1.  In  this  case,  the  optimal  long-term  growth  involves  the  active 
regulation  at  natural  conditions.  More  precisely,  we  get  the  following  important 
characterization: 
 
Lemma  2.  At  n=d,  any  interior  solution  (R,  m,  a)  of  the  OP  (10)-(17)  with  an 
exponentially  growing  R(t)  involves  the  binding  quota  E(t)=Emax starting  at  some  tk≥0,  
under the condition g<C, where C is the endogenous rate of optimal R(t). 
Proof. Let us consider R(t)=R0e
Ct, then b(t) »  ( )
Ct d e C b R
/ 1
0 /  by Lemma 1. 
We assume that E(t)<Emax at [tl,¥), tl≥0. Then, by Theorem 1, an OP interior regime (R, m, 
a) has to satisfy the nonlinear system (33) on [tl ,¥). Substituting the above R and b into the 
expressions (20) and (34) for IR'(t) and Ia'(t), we obtain from (33) that  
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t t Ca d e P e C b R
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1
,      tÎ[tl,¥).  (36) 
Equation (35) determines a, which is such that t-a(t)®¥ at t®¥ because of g<C. Equation 
(36)  determines  m  at  a  given  a.  After  introducing  the  function  f(t)  = 
k r e
t t a r - - -
- -
-
/ ] 1 )[ 1 (
] ) ( [
1
q and differentiating (36), we have  
             ) ( / / ) / )]( 1 ( [ ) (
1 t f bd b C d C r t m
d - - - = .                                               (37) 
Since f(t)<(1-q)/r for any possible k and a, then  
m(t) > const =  bd b C d C r r
d / ) / )]( 1 ( [
1- - - /(1-q)/r >0. Therefore, by (13), E(t) increases 
indefinitely at t®¥, our assumption is wrong and E(t)=Emax at some tk> tl.     
The lemma is proved.       
 
Some comments are in order here. First of all, though it involves a control variable, that is, 
R at the minute, the restriction g <C on the price of energy is still highly interesting. Of 
course, it is important to observe that since the growth rate C is endogenous, it may depend 
on g, and, therefore, the restriction might be impossible. We will show that it is not whence 
the  optimal  control  R(t)  better  characterized and the  optimal  growth  rate  C  uncovered.   18
Nonetheless, the restriction g <C sounds as a natural (sufficient) condition for the firm to 
overcome increasing scarcity as reflected by a strictly positive growth rate of the energy 
price. The fact that a permanent growth regime does imply active regulation at a finite time 
is  much  less  surprising,  provided  such  a  regime  exists.  Second,  the  restriction  g<C  is 
indeed  sufficient.  We  will  see  below  that  a  balanced  growth  with  the  active  quota 
regulation can take place at g=C as well. This is part of the following key theorem which 
essentially establishes the existence of balanced growth paths in the sense of Definition 1 
when  the  economic  and  institutional  environments  are  held  constant.  This  theorem  is 
crucial in that it fully characterizes the endogenous growth rate, C. 
 
Theorem 2 (about the balanced growth).  At  n=d and g ≤C, the interior optimal regime – 
BGP (RL, mL, aL) exists,  
     RL(t)»R e
Ct,   QL(t),bL(t),cL(t) ~ e
Ct,     mL(t)= M =const,   aL(t)=t– M E / ,         (38) 
where the constants C and M are determined by the nonlinear system 
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that has a positive solution, at least, at small r. Namely, if r <<1 and 
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/ 1 / 1 q - - < kr b E r
d d ,                                       (41) 
then C, 0<C<r, is a solution of the nonlinear equation  
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        (42) 
and  ) ( ) 1 /( 2 / r o k C E M + - = q .  Therefore, the  growth  rate  C  does  not  depend  on the 
energy price but does depend on the regulation parametersE and q. 
The uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed if  
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d .                                 (43) 
If  g <C, then the BGP (38) exists for any  R >0. If  g =C, then the BGP (38) is possible at 
the condition    19
                     




P E R .                           (44) 
 
The proof is long and it is reported in Appendix.
11 Before commenting on the theorem, let 
is state the following useful corollary. 
 
Corollary 1. For a given energy price growth rate g, let C be the solution of (39)-(40), C be 
independent of g, then, no BGP is possible at g >C. 
The  proof  immediately  follows  from  the  proof  of  Theorem  2  provided  in  Appendix 
(precisely, from formula (A13): indeed, if g >C , then cL(t)<0 at large t). 
 
Theorem  2  and  its  Corollary  make  clear  when  the  firm  can  still  grow  in  the  long-run 
despite scarcity. Without scarcity (g=0), sustainable growth regimes are possible despite 
input quotas and liquidity constraints. And such a property actually holds up to a certain 
threshold level of the growth rate of resource price (or of the scarcity degree). Theorem 2 
brings  more  striking  results.  First  of  all,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  resource  price 
  ) (
t e P t p
g = is not involved in the BGP (38) when g<C. In particular, the overall innovation 
rate is independent of the characteristics of the energy price patterns. In our model, this 
property comes naturally: if  g<C, then by Lemma 2 any balanced growth regime should 
involve active regulation (or a binding quota), and active regulation eliminates the resource 
price from the NCE formulas (18)-(22), as stated and economically interpreted in Section 3. 
So, the optimal long term dynamics (RL, mL, aL) are the same for any resource price path 
up to a certain rate. Second, this important property does not mean that resource prices play 
no role in the long-run. On one hand, Corollary 1 shows clearly that there is no hope to 
have a BGP if the growth rate of resource price (or in other words the degree of scarcity) is 
large enough. On the other hand, the resource price does matter in the edge-of-knife case 
g=C. Indeed, in the latter case, while the price level P  still does not impact the endogenous 
balanced  economy  rate  C,  the  cash-flow  non-negativity  requirement  precisely  implies 
                                                 
11 The proof of the Theorem is based on some approximation induced by the assumption that r is a small 
number (equal to some percents), that is r <<1, which is realistic. Notice that  by doing so, we are NOT 
assuming that r goes to zero. Doing so is erroneous: it would imply an infinite objective function 
along the interior solution.    20
condition (44), which limits the long-run R&D investment level depending on the value of  
P . 
Finally, notice that even if  g <C,  and while the long-term optimal policy is to invest the 
same in machines and in R&D whatever the resource price trajectory is, the latter does 
affect the optimal value of functional (10), since it impacts the optimal cash flows c*: 
higher p means a lower level of cash c. We shall see in Section 5 that the resource price 
impacts crucially the transition dynamics in our model. The role of this price in the long-
run dynamics is also a valid question when n>d (then the environmental regulation is not 
binding) and will be considered in Section 4.2 hereafter.  
Some more technical comments before comparative statics are useful. First of all, more can 
be said about the uniqueness of the growth rates C compatible with the BGP requirements. 
Indeed, if equation (42) has a solution 0 < C < r, then, in the general case, it has another 
solution C2, r<C2<r/(1-d). However, the larger solution C2 has no sense, since at C>r the 
value  of  (1)  is  infinite  and  c*(t)<0  (by  (A13)  given  in  Appendix).  Second,  it  is  very 
important  to  notice  that  in  Theorem  2,  the  BGP  scale  parameter  R   is  actually 
undetermined.  We  have  the  indeterminacy  of  the  long-term  dynamics  under  the  BGP, 
because  technical  progress  is  endogenous.  It  happens  for  similar  problems  in  the 
endogenous growth theory. A typical example is the Lucas-Uzawa model (Boucekkine and 
Ruiz-Tamarit, 2008).  
We shall now move to comparative statics, which are particularly useful in the context of 
Theorem 2 and its Corollary. Since the BGP growth rate C is independent of g, what are the 
possibilities to alter the value of C, for a given, possibly higher energy price growth rate? 
The needed properties are summarized hereafter. 
Corollary 2. At (26) and r<<1, a decrease of  E leads to the decrease of both optimal 
parameters C and  M , and leaves the long-term lifetime of capital goods unaltered since 
M ~E . A decrease of capital price k and/or of the tax q  increases the optimal C and  M  
and diminishes the long-term lifetime of capital goods. 
 
More stringent regulation through a decrease in  E  is bad for the growth rate of firms’ 
output and profit. Even though the firms can respond to tighter quotas by more innovation, 
such an instrument does not allow to completely circumvent the impact of more severe 
regulation. Lower capital prices are good for investment (in resource consumptions units)   21
and  also  prove  to  be  beneficial for  the  growth  rate  of firms’  output  and  profit.  Lower 
equipment  prices  make  firms  wealthier  and  such  a  positive  wealth  effect  boost  the 
investment either in capital or in R&D. For the same reasons, a lower tax rate q raises the 
optimal growth rate, C, and stimulates the two latter forms of investment. It should be 
noted at this point that both regulation parameters  E and q do matter in the BGP growth 
rate C. And they work in a way opposite to the Porter hypothesis, depressing growth and 
investment in the long-run.  
A further interesting result concerns the optimal long-term lifetime of capital goods. Since 
aL(t)=t–M /E , and  M ~E , it follows that a tighter environmental regulation leaves the 
optimal  lifetime  of  capital  goods  unaltered.  While  a  lower  E   does  reduce the optimal 
lifetime  of  machines,  such  a  tighter  regulation  also  pushes  the  investment  downward, 
which forces the maximizing firm to use fewer machines longer. These two effects appear 
to  offset each other  in our  framework. Under decreasing prices for capital goods (or a 
falling tax rate), the firm invests more and uses the machines for a shorter time. This is 
somehow  consistent  with  the  recent  literature  on  embodied  technological  progress 
observing  that  a  more  rapid  investment-specific  technological  progress  (like  the  one 
conveyed by the information and communication technologies) reduces the relative price of 
capital  goods  and  decreases  their  lifetime  due  to  rising  obsolescence  costs  (see,  for 
example, Krusell, 1998). 
 
4.2.  Cases n<d and n>d. 
In these cases, no BGP in the sense of Definition 1 exists. However, a long-term regime 
with  exponentially  growing  R  and  decreasing  m  appears  to  be  possible  at  a  special 
combination of given parameters (see also Yatsenko, Boucekkine and Hritonenko 2009, for 
other related dynamics) 
Theorem 3. Let (26) hold. Then: 
(a) If n<d, then no interior optimal regime with an exponentially growing R exists.  
(b)  If  n>d,  then  an  interior  optimal  regime  (RL,  mL,  aL)  such  that  RL(t)  grows 
exponentially, mL(t)®0 at t®¥, and E(t)<Emax, is possible ONLY if g=C, where C is the 
endogenous rate of RL(t).    22
The proof is provided in Boucekkine, Hritonenko, and Yatsenko (2008). When n>d, the 
efficiency of the R&D investment appears to be higher as compared with the investment 
into the new capital. Theorem 3 concludes that, in the optimal long-time regime, almost all 
the  output goes to R&D investment and the part of capital investments (exponentially) 
decreases in the total distribution of the output. Also, the quota constraint needs not to be 
binding and we can keep a larger amount of older assets (since we buy an increasingly 
smaller amount of new capital).  
In addition, by (29), the restriction k<(1-q)/r on the given capital price is necessary for the 
existence of any positive optimal regime. The resource price 
t e P
g plays a decisive role in 
the case n>d, in particular, an interior optimal path with an exponential RL is impossible if 
 g=0 (the resource price does not increase). Only when the resource price increases at the 
rate g=C,  an  interior  regime  with  exponentially  increasing  RL  and  decreasing  mL  is 
possible. The increase of 
t e P
g  raises aL(t), that is, decreases the lifetime of capital goods. 
In other words, a kind of induced-innovation mechanism seems to be active in the case 
n>d, that is, when the R&D activity is highly efficient, so efficient that the investment into 
equipment goes to zero. In such a case, the firm is in perpetual sharp modernization, and is 
not suffering at all from any regulation. We have to notice that this regime is not a BGP in 
the sense of Definition 1, because mL(t) asymptotically tends to zero. We shall disregard 
such a configuration in the short-term dynamics section below.  
 
5. Transition dynamics: Intensive Vs extensive growth 
From now on, we set n=d. For simplicity sake, let assumptions (26) hold.  
Since we have to deal with short-term dynamics in this section, some comments on initial 
conditions are in order. The OP solution (R*, m*, a*) satisfies the initial conditions (15). 
An  essential  initial  condition  is  a(0)=a0  because  the  endogenous  a(t)  is  continuous.  If 
a0¹aL(0), then the dynamics of (R*, m*, a*) involves a transition from the initial state 
a(0)=a0 to the long term interior trajectory aL. 
By (14), c(0) =  ) 1 ( q - Q(0)-p(0)E(0)-R(0)-kb(0)m0(0) ³ 0 at the initial state t=0, or  















+ - £ + ∫ ∫ t t b q
t
.                   (45)   23
Otherwise, the economic system is not possible at t=0 because the resource and capital 
prices p(0)=P and  k are too high. Condition (45) implies two simpler constraints: 
                            P  <  ) 1 ( q - B      and         km0(0) < E(0) ) 1 ( q - .                             (46)          
In the following, we shall sketch two possible transition depending on the initial conditions 
(initially dirty Vs clean firm).  
    
5.1.  Optimal intensive growth (the case of a dirty firm).  
Let us assume that E(t)=Emax starting with an instant tk, tk³0.  
Scenario 1: The intensive growth at the active resource quota. Let tk=0. The optimal 
dynamics at t³tk follows Case A of Theorem 1 (with the E(t)=Emax restriction). This regime 
is a growth with intensive capital renovation induced by technical progress. In order to 
make  a  new  capital  investment  m(t),  the  firm  needs  to  scrap  some  obsolete  capital 
m(a(t))a’(t), following equality (13) or 




) ( =Emax.  
The optimal R&D innovation R*(t) is the interior trajectory RL(t) determined from IR'(t)=0, 
where IR'(t) is given by (20). The optimal R*(t) reaches the trajectory RL(t) immediately 
after tk. The OP has the interior turnpike trajectory aL for the capital lifetime, determined 
from Im'(t)=0 or 
              [ ] ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) 1 (
) (
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If aL(0)=a0, then the optimal a*ºaL. If aL(0)¹a0, then we can show that the optimal a*(t) 
will reach aL(t) at some time tl>tk. If aL(0)<a0, then the optimal investment m*(t)=0 is 
minimal at 0<t£tl (otherwise, c*(t)=0 and m*(t) is determined by additional considerations). 
Later,  at  t>tl,  the  optimal  m*(t)  has  cycles  (the  replacement  echoes  as  in  Boucekkine, 
Germain and Licandro, 1997) determined by the prehistory of m(t) on [a0, tk]. A formal 
proof of this optimal m*, a* dynamics can be done similarly to Hritonenko and Yatsenko 
(2005).   24
Under Scenario 1, the resource price does not enter the NCE formulas (18)-(22). However, 
an increase of the resource price reduces the corresponding optimal c*(t) and, therefore, 
can make the optimal transition longer (if aL(0)>a0). Figure 1 and the following simulation 
example illustrate this scenario.  
Example 1. Let  
             r=0.05,   d=n=0.5,   b=0.01,   Emax(t)=E =10.5,    k(t)=0.12,    p(t)=0.5,  
              q=0,       a0 = -2,   b0=1,   R0(t)=0,   m0(t)=5.25,    tÎ[-2,0].                                     
and B=b(0)=1 by (16). Then, there is the BGP, determined by Theorem 2 above, 
                 RL(t)=R e
Ct,  C=0.01,   mL(t)=M  =2.1,     aL(t)=t–5   ,  tÎ[0,¥),                           
indicated by the grey lines in Figure 1. In this case, E(0)=m0a0=5.25*2=10.5 is equal to Emax(0)= 
E , hence, the quota (13) is active starting t=0. Since aL(0)=-5 < a0=-2, then the optimal a*(t)= -2 
and m*(t)=0 at 0<t£tl=3. After tl, the optimal a*(t) coincides with the BGP aL(t) and m*(t)=m*(t-5) 
exhibits replacement echoes. 
5.2.  Optimal extensive growth (the case of a firm-non-polluter).  
This case means that the consumed resource E(t) at the initial state t=0 is lower than the 
limit Emax. Let us assume that E(t)<Emax at 0£t<tk, where the moment tk will be determined. 
Mathematically,  this  scenario  is  more  complicated  and  involves  the  case  c*(t)=0,  not 
covered by Theorem 1.  
We assume that p(t)=
t e P
g  is not too high, so that  
          [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( '
) (
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on the “extensive-growth” part [0, tk] of transition dynamics. Then, m*(t) is maximal on 
interval [0, tk]. On the other side, by (20), IR'(t)>0 at small R*(t), hence, the optimal R*(t) is 
positive. In this case, the constraint c*(t)³0 in (14) limits both controls R* and m*:  
                          ) 1 ( q - Q*(t) - R*(t) - k(t)b*(t)m*(t) - p(t)E*(t) ³ 0.                         
Then, the transition optimal dynamics on some initial period [0, tk] is determined by the 
restriction c*(t)=0, i.e., the optimal m*(t) and R*(t) are connected by  
                 R*(t) + k(t)b*(t)m*(t) =  ) 1 ( q - Q*(t) - p(t)E*(t),    tÎ[0, tk].                      
Therefore, we need a first order condition for this case.    25
Lemma    3.  If  E*(t)<Emax(t)  and  c*(t)=0  at  tÎ[0,tk],  then  the  interior  optimal  R*(t)>0 
satisfies the condition 


























,    (48) 
where the function c(t)=exp(-rt) at tÎ[tk,∞) and c(t) is found from the following Volterra 
integral equation of the second kind:  
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at tÎ[0,tk]. The optimal m*(t)>0 is found from (53) at the given R*(t), and the optimal 
a*(t)=0 at Ia’'(t)<0 or a*(t)>0 satisfies Ia’'(t)=0, where  
      t t t b q t
t d a m a p e t I
r
t
a )) ( ( ] )) ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( [   ) ( '   ' - - =
-
¥
∫ .                   (50) 
Proof is provided in Appendix.  
Lemma 3 defines the following extensive-growth scenario on some initial period [0, tk] of 
the transition optimal dynamics. 
 
Scenario 2: Extensive growth. If g=0 (the price p(t) is constant), then by (50) Ia''(t)<0 at 
aºa0, hence, a*ºa0 is optimal while E(t)<Emax (as in Example 2 below). So, one can buy a 
new capital and there is no need to remove the old one, i.e., we have an extensive growth. 
If  g>0  (p(t)  increases),  then  the  optimal  a*(t)=0  while 
t e P
g <b0  and  a*(t)  increases 
following Ia'(t)=0 at 
t e P
g >b0 on [0,tk]. If g<C (p(t) increases slower than the BGP), then 
the optimal capital lifetime t-a*(t) increases while E(t)<Emax(t). 
By (48), IR'(t)>0 at small R*(t), hence, the optimal R*(t) is positive and, therefore, b*(t) 
increases. If b*(t) increases, then by (46) the optimal investment m* is maximal and is 
determined by Lemma 3 while E(t)<Emax. Since both optimal m* and t-a*(t) increase, the 
quota E(t)=Emax will be reached soon and the optimal renovation dynamics will switch to 
Scenario 1 with the active constraint (13). The end tk of the “extensive-growth” transition 
period [0, tk] is determined from condition E(tk)= Emax. 
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Example 2. Let all given parameters be as in Example 1 but  
                                         m0(t) = 2,  tÎ[-2,0].                                                           (51) 
Then the BGP (51) is the same as in Example 1 but the transition dynamics is different.  
In this case, E(0)=m0a0=2*2=4 is less than Emax(0)=E =10.5, hence, the quota (13) is inactive on an 
initial interval [0, tk] at the beginning of the planning horizon. The dynamics of optimal m*(t) and 
R*(t) on [0, tk] follow the restriction c*(t)=0 and is shown in  Figure 2. The determination of m* 
and  R*  is  based  on  Lemma  3.  It  appears  that  m*(t)=17.8,  R*(t)=0.003  at  0£t£tk.    Then,  the 
corresponding E*(t) increases fast and reaches the limit value E =10.5 at tk »0.36. The later optimal 
dynamics on [tk,¥) is described by Case A of Theorem 1 and is similar to Scenario 1. Namely, since 
aL(0.36)<a0=-2, then a*(t)= -2 and the optimal m*(t)=0 is minimal during the second part of 
transition dynamics, 0.36 < t £ tl=3. Later, at t>3, a*(t)=aL(t) and the optimal m*(t)=m*(t-5) is 
determined by its previous dynamics on [-2, 3]. 
 
The optimal dynamics highlighted in this scenario are quite new in the related economic 
literature (see for example, Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro, 1997). They deserve some 
comments: 
i)  At first, note that the modernization policy chosen by the firm consists of increasing 
investment in new equipment and R&D without scrapping the older and more resource 
consuming machines. In Hritonenko and Yatsenko (1996) and Boucekkine et al. (1997), the 
modernization policy also encompasses scrapping part of the older capital goods in a way 
similar to the intensive growth scenario described in Section 5.2. The reason behind this 
difference is quite elementary: a firm with a low enough initial capital stock (and so, with 
low enough initial resource consumption) has no incentive to scrap its old machines as long 
as its resource quota constraint is not binding. In contrary, at a binding quota, investing in 
new machines is not possible without scrapping some obsolete older machines because of 
market clearing conditions or binding regulation constraints. 
ii)  Note that in our case firms which are historically “small” polluters are precisely 
those which are historically “small” producers. Extended to a country level, our exercise 
predicts  that  historically  poor  countries  will  find  it  optimal  to  massively  invest  and, 
therefore, to massively pollute during their development process. During such a transition, 
new and clean machines will co-exist with old and dirty machines in the productive sectors, 
implying an unambiguously dirty transition.   27
5.3. The impact of resource price on extensive growth. 
In the case of extensive growth (Scenario 2), the transition dynamics is directly impacted 
by the behavior of the resource price 
t e P
g . Let g>0 and, for simplicity sake, q =0. 
Theorem 4. If the transition dynamics period [0, tk] with E*(t)<Emax is relatively short such 
that  1 0 << k t b  and  1 max 0 ] 0 , [ 0
<< m t
a k , then an increase of the resource price p(t) increases the 
R&D investment R*(t), decreases capital investment m*(t), and increases the length tk of 
the period. In the case of an arbitrary interval [0, tk], the R&D investment R*(t) increases, 
at  least,  on  some  parts  of  [0,  tk].  The  capital  lifetime  t-a*(t)  remains  the  same  while 
t e P




The proof is in Appendix. Apart from technicalities, Theorem 4 allows us to deepen the 
knowledge  on  functioning  of  the  induced-innovation  Hicksian  mechanisms  in  a 
sophisticated  model  like  ours  where  firms  have  three  controls  in  hand.  The  theorem 
establishes the existence of such a modernization mechanism, at least, during some time 
along the transition. It is not difficult to construct extreme cases, not covered by Theorem 
4, where the Hicksian mechanism fails to appear.  However, the general wisdom one has to 
extract  from  this  exercise  is  that  the  latter  mechanism  is  still  relevant  in  sophisticated 
models like ours.    
This said, the picture conveyed by Theorem 4 is an accurate and peculiar modernization 
process.  While  rising resource  prices  may  stimulate  R&D  at  some  points in time, they 
definitely depress investment in capital goods. It becomes optimal for the firm to find an 
efficient way to save resources, and to delay the investment in equipment. Modernization 
also works via scrapping, provided resource prices are shifted to large enough levels. In 
such a case, the firms start to scrap older equipment and technologies while decreasing 
investment  in  equipment  and  increasing  the  resource-saving  R&D  effort.  This  is  quite 
consistent  with  available  descriptions  of  how  the  inducement  works  in  practice.  For 
example, Newell et al. (1999) make it clear that a major observed effect of changes in 
energy process and in energy-efficiency standards is the commercialization of new models 
and elimination of old ones.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
In  this  paper,  we  have  studied  in  depth  the  optimal  behavior  of  a  firm  subject  to 
environmental-based  quotas,  resource  scarcity  and  liquidity  constraints.  In  addition,  the 
vintage structure adds realism to the problem under study and considerably enriches the 
discussion. We have extracted some new results, either in the investigation of short-term 
dynamics (optimal modernization strategies) or in the analysis of long-run growth regimes 
(sustainability).  We  have  also  characterized  the  general  contours  of  the  Hicksian 
mechanisms at work in the model, ultimately showing its peculiar but predominant nature. 
A few remarks are in order. Of course, our results are based on price-taking firms and our 
modeling  of  liquidity-constraints  is  probably  too  simple.  Adding  market  power  is  no 
problem, although it is not likely that our results would be dramatically altered. Modelling 
and treating the liquidity constraints more accurately is a much more complicated task, 
both mathematically and conceptually. We believe that allowing firms to incur into debt to 
fasten its modernization and compliance to legal standards is a quite decisive issue that 
should be considered in more comprehensive research. This is our next step. 
 
7. Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof is based on general perturbation techniques of the optimization 
theory. Analogous approach has been earlier used in Hritonenko and Yatsenko (1996, 2005, 2006) 
and Yatsenko (2004) for simpler vintage models with exogenous technological change.  
Let us consider Case (B) first.  
 
Case (B). If the restriction (13) is inactive, E*(t)<Emax(t) at tÎD, then we choose R, m, and v=a' as 
the independent unknown variables of the OP. Then, the differential restriction a'(t)³0 in (14) has 




bounded a.e. on [0,¥). Substituting (17) to (16), we obtain expression (22) for b(t).    
We refer to measurable functions dR, dm, and dv as the admissible variations, if R, m, v, R+dR, 
m+dm, and v+dv, satisfy constraints (14)-(15). 
Let us give small admissible variations dR(t), dm(t), and dv(t), tÎ(0,¥), to a, m, and R and find the 
corresponding variation  ) , , ( ) , , ( v m R I v v m m R R I I - + + + = d d d d  of the objective functional I. 
Using (10)-(13), we obtain that    29
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where  ∫ =
t
d v t a
0
) ( ) ( x x d d . To prove the Theorem, we shall transform the expression (A1) to the 
form  
    ) , , ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (
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where the norm is  | ) ( | sup
) , 0 [
t f e ess f
rt -
¥
= . It will involve several steps. First, using the Taylor 
expansion f(x+dx)=f(x)+f’(x)dx+o(dx) twice, we have that  
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Next, using (A3) and the elementary property  t t t t t t
d
d
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integrals, we transform (A1) to   30
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where max{a(t),0} emphasizes that the variations dR(t), dm(t) are non-zero only on the interval 
[0,¥). 
Next, we interchange the limits of integration in the second term of (A4) as 
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in the first term as 
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and  in  the  fifth  term  similarly.  To  transform  the  third  term,  we  use  the  Taylor  expansion 
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. Collecting coefficients of dR, dm, and da, we rewrite 
(A4) as: 
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Finally, recalling ∫ =
t
d v t a
0
) ( ) ( x x d d , we convert the last expression to   31
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Formula (A5) in notations (21), (24), (25) provides the required expression (A2). The domain (14) 
of admissible controls R, m, v has the simple standard form R³0, m³0, v³0.  So, the NCE (23) 
follows  from  the  obvious  necessary  condition  that  the variation  dI of  functional  I   can  not  be 
positive for any admissible variations dR(t), dm(t), dv(t), tÎ[0,¥).   
Case (A). If the restriction of (13) is active: E(t) = Emax(t) at tÎDÌ[0,¥), then we choose R and m as 
the independent unknowns of the OP. The dependent (state) variable a is uniquely determined from 
the initial problem  
           m(a(t))a¢(t) = m(t) - Emax¢(t),     a(0)= a0, 
obtained after differentiating (13). As shown in Hritonenko and Yatsenko (2006), if Emax¢(t)£0, then 
for any measurable m(t)³0, a unique a.e. continuous function a(t)<t exists and a.e. has a'(t)³0 (see 
Remark 1 about the possible case Emax¢(t)>0). Therefore, the state restrictions a'(t)³0 and a(t)<t in 
(14) are satisfied automatically, so we can exclude a from the extremum condition.  
Similarly to the previous case, let us give small admissible variations dR(t) and dm(t), tÎ[0,¥), to R 
and m and find the corresponding variation  ) , ( ) , ( m R I m m R R I I - + + = d d d  of the functional I. 
In this case, the variation da is determined by dm. To find their connection, let us present (13) as    
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We will use the above formula (A4) for the variation dI as a function of dR, dm, and da and 
eliminate da from (A4) using (A6). To do that, we rewrite the third term of (D4) as   32
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  and  applying  (A6).  The  integral 
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in (A7) has the order o(da) because b(t) is continuous.  
Substituting (A7) into (A4) and collecting the coefficients of dm and dR, we obtain the expression  
           ) , ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (
0
m R o dt t m t I t R t I I m R d d d d d + × ¢ + × ¢ =∫
¥
                               (A8) 
in the notations (20) and (21). The rest of the proof is identical to Case B. 
The Theorem is proved.     
Proof of Theorem 2:  By Lemma 1, at n=d  
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The substitution of (26), (38), and (A9) into equation (29) leads to 
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and, after integration, to  


























that can be rewritten as (39). Substituting (37), (38), and (A9) to (30) gives  
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which becomes (40) after integration.   33
Equations  (39)  and  (40)  may  have  a  positive  solution  C  and  M   at  natural  assumptions.  In 
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which has the solution   ) ( ) 1 /( 2 / r o k C E M + - = q .  
Now, expressing the exponent in (39) as the Taylor series, we obtain  
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Substituting the obtained M   into (A10) leads to one equation (42) for C. To analyze this equation, 
we use the new variable  C x = and rewrite (42) as  
                                              F1(x) = F2(x),                           (A11) 
where    F1(x)= )) 1 ( (
2 2 / 2 - +
- d x r x
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These functions are shown in Figure 3 and are such that F1(0)=0, F1’(x)>0 at 0<x< r , F1’(x)=0 at 
x= r ,  and  F2’(x)>0  at  0<x< r ,  F2’(x)=0  at  x= r .  Also,  F2(x)<0<F1(x)  at  small  0<x<<1. 
Therefore, to have a solution 0 < x <  r  to equation (A11), it is necessary and sufficient that 
F2( r )>F1( r ), which leads to the inequality (41). The sufficient condition for the uniqueness of 
x is F1’(x)<F2’(x) at 0<x< r , which leads to (43).  
Finally, let us prove that cL(t)>0 at large t.  
By (12),  
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Expressing the exponent in (A12) as the Taylor series and using (A10), we obtain  
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Thus, cL(t)>0 at large enough t for any positive value  R  if g <C, and at 




P E R   
if g =C.  The theorem is proved.            
Proof of Lemma 3: We apply the method of Lagrange multipliers to take into account the equality-
constraint  
                        R(t) + k(t)b(t)m(t) = Q(t) - p(t)E(t),    tÎ[0, tk].                                
Let us introduce the Lagrange multiplier l(t), tÎ[0,∞), for this equality  and notice that l(t)=0 at 
tÎ[tk,∞) because of the complementary slackness condition. Now we minimize the Lagrangean  
                          dt t t c I L ) ( ) 0 ) ( (
0
l - + = ∫
¥
           
instead of the functional I (10). Providing all transformations as in the proof of Theorem 1, we 
arrive to the following expression   
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and Iv'(t) is given by the same formula (25).     35
 Following the method of Lagrange multipliers, we will choose l(t) from the condition  I ˆ¢ m(t)=0,  
tÎ[0, tk].  In the new variable c(t)=[1-l(t)]e
-rt, it leads to the formula (49). The expression for I ˆ¢ R(t) 
in the variable c is (48) and I ˆ¢ R(t)=0 on [0, tk] for interior R*. The lemma is proved.      
Proof of Theorem 4: We will compare the transition dynamics on [0, tk] under two different 
increasing prices p(t) and p(t)+dp, where dp=const>0 on [0,a
-1(tk)] or [0,∞). The perturbation dp 
causes perturbations da(t), dm(t), dR(t) and db(t) of the corresponding optimal a*(t), m*(t), R*(t) 
and b*(t) on interval [0, tk) as well as the change dtk of the interval length. The further optimal 
dynamics on [tk,∞) follows the above Scenario 1. At t>tk, dR(t)=0 because IR'(t) does not depend on 
p, and dm(t)=0 because m*(t) is boundary on [tk, t1]. However,  









1 - - ∫ =    for all   tÎ[0,∞).          (A14)     
By (56), da(t)= )) ( ( ' / t a p b d <0 on [0, tk] is determined from the equation Ia'(t)=0 or da(t)=0 if 
p(t)<b0. The perturbations dm(t), dR(t), db(t), and the auxiliary dc(t) should not violate equalities 
(53)-(55). Varying (53), we obtain 
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Varying (49), we obtain 
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Finally, varying (48), we obtain   36
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The proof is clear in the case of small tkb0<<1 and  1 max 0 ] 0 , [ 0
<< m t
a k . Then,  ) ( ) ( k t o t = db  by (A14) 
and by (A16) dc(t) )] ( 1 [
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d <0, tÎ[0,tk], at dp>0.  By (A17), 
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on the interval [0,tk]. Substituting dR to (A15), we obtain  )] ( 1 [
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d <0,  
tÎ[0,tk]. Therefore, R*(t) is larger and m*(t) is smaller at a higher resource price p(t).  
Let  us  estimate  the  change  dtk of  the  interval  length.  The  instant  tk is  determined  from  the 
equality max
) (





= ∫ t t .  Varying  this  equality,  we  obtain 





k k k k ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) (
) (∫ - = .  As  shown  above,  da(t)≥0  and  dm(t)<0,  therefore, 
dtk>0.  
In the case of an arbitrary [0,tk], we have the system (A14)-(A17) of four non-Volterra integral 
equations  of the second kind for dR(t), dm(t), db(t), dc(t), tÎ[0,tk], which is difficult to analyze 
qualitatively. The only conclusion we can provide is the following.   
Let  db(tk)≥0, then by (A15) dR(t)>0, at least, on some parts of interval [0, tk]. Now let db(tk)<0, 
then db(t)≤0 on some final part [tc,tk], tc<tk, by continuity. Then, by (A16) dc(t)<0 on [tc,tk]. By 
(A17)   37
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>0  at  k t t® , 
hence dR(t)>0, at least, near the end of interval [0, tk].  
The theorem is proved.   
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Figure 1. Transition and long-term dynamics under active environment regulation from Example 1 
(at specific initial conditions a0 and m0). The dotted lines indicate the BGP regime. The dashed line 
shows the inverse function a
-1. 
   40
  











Figure 2. Transition and long-term dynamics under inactive environment regulation from Example 




















Figure 3. Solving the nonlinear equation (A9) with respect to the unknown  C x = .  
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